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Abstract. This paper outlines a strategy for building semantically mean-
ingful representations and carrying out effective reasoning in technical
knowledge domains such as mathematics. Our central assertion is that
the semi-structured Q&A format, as used on the popular Stack Exchange
network of websites, exposes domain knowledge in a form that is already
reasonably close to the structured knowledge formats that computers can
reason about. The knowledge in question is not only facts – but discur-
sive, dialectical, argument for purposes of proof and pedagogy. We there-
fore assert that modelling the Q&A process computationally provides a
route to domain understanding that is compatible with the day-to-day
practices of mathematicians and students. This position is supported by
a small case study that analyses one question from Mathoverflow in de-
tail, using concepts from argumentation theory. A programme of future
work, including a rigorous evaluation strategy, is then advanced.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we outline a computational approach to modelling mathematical
dialogues, and show how it can be used to model Q&A dialogues in particular.
We argue that a strongly empirical approach – along these lines – can support
the development of robust, knowledge-rich, mathematical artificial intelligence.
Mathematical dialogues convey the processes through which new mathematics is
created and existing mathematics is taught. We claim that mathematical ques-
tion and answer (Q&A) dialogues are a practically and theoretically important
subclass. In particular, there is now a large corpus of mathematical questions,
answers, and accompanying discussion available in online Q&A forums.
The Q&A forums that we consider here are “social machines” – defined by
Tim Berners-Lee to be a class of systems “in which the people do the creative
work and the machine does the administration” [4]. Question-and-answer web-
sites differ from other popular social machine formats, like general purpose fo-
rums, wikis, and mailing lists – with which they nevertheless share some features
– in the relatively explicit semantics that they support (and require).
This has to do with both content and form. The Stack Exchange network
of Q&A sites has a network-wide norm of focusing on questions whose answers
are not primarily opinion-based: in other words, questions which have answers
that can be considered “right” or “wrong,” or that can otherwise be compared
with each other in objective (as opposed to purely subjective) terms. Stack Ex-
change sites treat a wide range of technical and non-technical subjects, ranging
from computer programming, to travel, to advice on academic careers, the in-
ternal logic of science fiction universes, and beyond. It has two specialist sites
devoted to mathematics: Mathoverflow, for research-level Q&A (often dealing
with new, open, conjectures, and for which background approximately equiv-
alent to a strong mathematics degree is a minimum barrier to entry), and
math.stackexchange.com, which focuses on non-research mathematics (e.g., at
school, university, or postgraduate level). Whereas a mailing list, for example,
would permit more open-ended discussions, the questions discussed on these
websites tend to have right and wrong answers, and the discussion focuses on
exposition of the correct answer (or answers).
Technical Q&A often embody knowledge about “how to” as well as “what
is.” In this regard, Q&A is similar to computer programming [38] – and it is no
coincidence that the most popular site on the Stack Exchange subject is devoted
to programming concepts. As a commentary on the medium and its affordances,
it is useful to note that, by number of questions, the math.stackexchange.com
website is the second-most popular site in the Stack Exchange network.4
Mathematical Q&A has some interesting things in common with other kinds
of mathematical discussions, such as the discussions that take place among pro-
fessional mathematicians working on a paper together, or among novice problem-
solvers leading to personally-new insights. Both these types of dialogues have
been studied extensively – in some cases using online discussions as a ready
source of data [3, 31, 35, 37].
Proof dialogues often contain Q&A sub-dialogues: for example, a discussant
may state “I’m sorry, I don’t understand what you did in this part of the proof”
or “I don’t understand why this works, but it seems to.” Similarly, Q&A dia-
logues contain elements of mathematical argumentation, typically sufficient to
convince the querent and subsequent readers. Following Walton [42], Aberdein
has outlined a range of purposes that “proof” may serve: inquiry, persuasion, in-
formation seeking, deliberation, negotiation, and debate [1]. Q&A dialogues seem
to serve many similar purposes. Martin and Pease [26] developed an empirically-
founded typology of questions on Mathoverflow (expanding on Mendes and Milic-
Frayling’s earlier study [28]). The three popular types of questions observed were
“Is it true that. . . ?”, “What is this?”, and “Could I have an example please?”
(we summarise this earlier work in more detail below).
We support our case for a strongly empirical approach to mathematical AI by
building a proof-of-concept model of a Q&A dialogue, using a technique from ar-
gumentation theory [5] with suitable adaptations for the mathematics domain.
We have stated the motivations for this approach elsewhere [27], and demon-
4 http://stackexchange.com/sites#questions
strated its overall salience [32]. In brief, we show in [32] that it is possible to
build meaningful computational models of proof dialogue. However, this earlier
work dealt with the high-level logic of argument structure. Here we demonstrate
extensions that provide a much more detailed model. We will summarise the
relevant background below, and in our small proof-of-concept case study, intro-
duce enough formalism to walk through an example in detail. The outline of the
paper is as follows.
– We present a brief overview of relevant background in Section 2.
– Section 3 develops the main case study.
– Section 4 offers discussion and an outline of future work.
2 Background
2.1 Overview
The approach we take in this paper is grounded in a part of argumentation re-
search called Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT), which was designed to model
the inferential structure of dialogues, by connecting statements with their logical
import [5]. In a recent paper we have described a broadly IAT-inspired theory
that uses a constrained set of rules called a dialogue game to model mathemat-
ical discourse [32]. The specific set of rules were adapted from Lakatos’s Proofs
and Refutations [21]. The “Lakatos game” developed in [32] is a formalised ap-
proximation of the “informal logic” that people use when arguing about con-
cepts on the way to a shared proof. The dialogue game shows which assertions
are being used to support or to argue against a given conjecture, and it shows
when assertions are in conflict with each other. This leads to a sociologically
interesting, but rather atypical, idea of a proof as a developing set of mutually
coherent statements that support a given conjecture, and that have yet to be
successfully refuted. This conception of proof is at odds with the way mathemati-
cians (and, especially, formal mathematicians) would describe proofs, i.e., that
proofs are derivations from axioms by way of valid inference rules. Philosophers
of mathematics have expressed doubt as to whether mathematical worldviews
as different as these can be brought into alignment with each other in a rou-
tine way [39]. Nevertheless, mathematics has a logical structure, embodied in
its theories and objects, which is typically not subject to debate. For instance,
two numbers are either co-prime, or not. Accordingly, we have been developing
a new strategy for representing mathematical discussions, in which ‘The Cay-
ley graph of group G’, for example, is modelled as an object; the relationship
between the proposition P and the proposition ‘P is difficult to prove’ is made
explicit; and in which Lakatos-style conjectures, refutations, and repair are mod-
elled. We call this framework IAT+Content or IATC. Inferential structure, like
implies, describes statements about pieces of mathematical content ; meta-level
reasoning tactics, like goal or auxiliary, are used to strategise proof develop-
ment; heuristics guide the proof or manipulate content. New nodes are brought
Legend
into being in connection
with IAT-style performa-
tives labelled agree, assert,
challenge, define, query,
retract, and suggest. The
Legend at right provides a
schematic summary of the
features of IATC.
While the proto-language is not complete (and not yet implemented, like
the work in [32]), we hope to show that it can be used to model real-world
mathematical dialogues. In the current paper, we focus on Q&A dialogues. These
were summarised above; some further detail on this specific domain follows.
2.2 Q&A
The strategies used by Mathoverflow “contributors [to] communicate and col-
laborate to solve new mathematical ‘micro-problems’ online” have been studied
previously [40], and a typology of collaborative acts was proposed: 1. provide
information; 2. clarify the question; 3. critique an answer ; 4. revise an answer ;
5. extend an answer. The study focused on understanding, quantitatively, how
these different activities contributed to answer quality. Some more specific ac-
tivities within this framework are noted in an example,5 e.g., 1→ referencing a
related Q&A post, which IATC might model as an ‘auxiliary’ problem; 2→
stating that the question is harder than the related post, which IATC would
model with a (reversed) ‘easy’ heuristic value judgement. This framework is
useful as a high-level check on the completeness of IATC.
The difficulty of questions in math.stackexchange.com has been studied [24].
However, this was done, not primarily by examining the content of questions,
but by devising a “competition-based” score that estimates a given question’s
difficulty using the estimated expertise of discussion participants (learned via
a Bayesian model). In particular: “the expertise score of the best answerer is
higher than that of the asker as well as all other answerers.” Then, the difficulty
of a question is estimated to be “higher than the expertise score of asker ua, but
lower than that of the best answerer ub.” These authors defer a detailed analysis
of question content to future work.
Mathoverflow. Related work by some of us examined the production of math-
ematics on Mathoverflow [26]. A typology of questions was developed, as follows:
– Conjecture 36% — asks if a mathematical statement is true. May ask
directly “Is it true that” or ask under what circumstances a statement is
true. (This corresponds to the purpose of ‘inquiry’ noted by Walton.)
– What is this 28% — describes a mathematical object or phenomenon and
asks what is known about it. (This also corresponds to ‘inquiry’.)
5 http://mathoverflow.net/q/12732
– Example 14% — asks for examples of a phenomenon or an object with
particular properties. (This may be ‘inquiry’ or ‘information seeking’.)
– Formula 5% — ask for an explicit formula or computation technique.
– Different proof 5% — asks if there is an alternative to a known proof. In
particular, since our sample concerns the field of group theory, a number of
questions concern whether a certain result can be proved without recourse
to the classification of finite simple groups.
– Reference 4% — asks for a reference for something the questioner believes
to be already documented in the literature
– Perplexed 3% — ask for help in understanding a phenomenon or difficulty.
A typical question in this area might concern why accounts from two different
sources (for example Wikipedia and a published paper) seem to contradict
each other.
– Motivation 3% — asks for motivation or background. A typical question
might ask why something is true or interesting, or has been approached
historically in a particular way.
– Other 2% — closed by moderators as out of scope, duplicates, etc.
Answers are also examined, although in less detail. Responses typically present
information known to the respondent, and readily checked by other users, but
not necessarily assumed to be known by them. Some specific findings:
– Existing research literature 56% — over half of the questions in the
sample refer to existing literature
– Errors 37% — many questions (and answers) contain errors; these are
acknowledged politely, and corrected when pointed out.
– Examples 34% — the use of specific examples gives some evidence of
broadly “Lakatosian” reasoning (i.e., per [21]).
3 Case study
In this section we will use the IATC formalism to analyse one example Q&A
dialogue in detail.6 We quote the text of this dialogue verbatim, and present
the analysis graphically. We selected one of the questions from Mathoverflow
that was part of the sample described above: the example was classed as an
“Is it true that. . . ?” question; examples and references are supplied. As they
appear on the site, both the specific question and the top-rated answer are quite
succinct. Below, we will replay the conversation in order. As we will see, most
of the interesting argumentation takes place in comments.
(Original question, 18:05) I have seen this problem, that if G is a finite
group and H is a proper subgroup of G with finite index then G 6=⋃
g∈G
ghg−1. Does this remain true for the infinite case also. [→ Figure 1]
The first follow-up comment to be submitted observes that this question doesn’t
quite make sense as written, and suggests a correction.
6 http://mathoverflow.net/q/34044
Fig. 1. Original question, diagrammed
(First comment on question, 18:15) There’s something I don’t under-
stand here: do you perhaps mean gHg−1 instead of ghg−1? [→ Figure 2]
Meanwhile, it seems an answer was already being composed, since the fol-
lowing text appeared on the site one minute after the above clarification.7
(Answer, 18:16) Not in general. Every matrix in GL2(C) is conjugate to
an invertible upper triangular matrix (use eigenvectors), and the invert-
ible upper triangular matrices are a proper subgroup. [→ Figure 3]
Even though an answer has been given, suggestions for fine-tuning the ques-
tion continue in the comments.
(Second comment on question, 18:20) Yes, the statement is out of focus:
gHg−1 is intended (and “infinite index case”). The natural starting point
is to ask whether the proof for finite index breaks down. [→ Figure 4]
Quite a lot happens in the foregoing short comment. A change in the problem’s
set of hypotheses is suggested. The analogy to the known “inspiring” theorem for
finite groups is deemed not particularly relevant, and its hypotheses are changed
as well. This then suggests a strategy for proving the (revised) problem. (NB.,
to save room, in the diagram that follows, we have elided some of the structure
that accumulated earlier: the earlier nodes and links are still assumed.)
7 At this point, the discussion becomes multi-threaded, since comments can now attach
to the answer as well.
Fig. 2. First comment on question, diagrammed
Fig. 3. Answer, diagrammed
Fig. 4. Second comment on question, diagrammed
In the following comment, both the foregoing refinements and the earlier
proposed answer are taken into account.
(Third comment on question, 18:24) If G is a finite group then all its
subgroups have finite index. What the statement should say is that if H
is a proper finite index subset of G then G 6= ∪g∈GgHg−1 (the case of
infinite G readily reduces to the case of finite G). As Keith shows, this
is not always true for subgroups of infinite index. [→ Figure 5]
Here, the earlier assertion that [G : H] is the “wrong hypothesis” is chal-
lenged. Essentially, this comment is looking for the most precise way to phrase
the problem statement. “[G : H] finite” is not wrong, but necessary if we want
the implication to hold. The counterexample of invertible upper triangular ma-
trices – “Keith’s counterexample”, diagrammed in Figure 3 – does indeed have
infinite index in GL2(C).
8 It is not, therefore, precisely a counterexample to the
three-part conjunction in that diagram that it appears to refute; it does serve as
a counterexample to the revised three-part conjunction in Figure 4. One should
keep in mind that the statement “not in general” that prefaces the answer was
addressed not to the specific conjunction in Figure 3, but instead to the OP’s
considerably more vague question “Does this remain true for the infinite case
8 Intuitively, upper-triangular 2×2 matrices have one element that is zero, so the sub-
group has one codimension in GL2(C), namely, a copy of C. The fact that the index
is infinite follows (but an algebraic proof is also straightforward). For an example of
an infinite group and a subgroup with finite index, consider Z and 2Z: in this case,
the group is equal to the union of cosets.
Fig. 5. Third comment on question, diagrammed
also?” Once the question has been clarified by other contributors, the logic of
the answer works.
Subsequent to this, further terminological issues arise in comments on the
answer, which again have to do with understanding exactly what is being asked,
e.g., adding another condition of “discreteness” to the conjunction, for an answer
with an even more “finite feel.” New examples are proposed, both with refer-
ence to the literature and by straightforward adaptation of the answer already
presented. In addition, four alternative answers are supplied, without attracting
further comment (but with argumentation provided “in advance”, so to speak).
We will not draw diagrams for this material, because the illustrative presentation
above is sufficient for our current purposes.
4 Discussion and Future Work
The case study that was examined above shows both the basic promise of the
argument-theoretic approach to modelling mathematics, and some of the dif-
ficulties that would have to be overcome in ‘scaling up’ this approach. Bundy
argues that the right representation is the key to successful reasoning [6, p. 16].
While both representation and reasoning are crucial (and, for ‘functional infer-
ence’, it is important to be strategic about representations of reasoning) in a
material sense, the logically-prior step is that of building the representation. One
alternative to hand-coding is to search for catalogues of existing data, and more
specifically, of reasoning, that have already been represented in some prelimi-
nary and readily digestible form. Learning from text was a key part of IBM’s
approach in building the version of Watson that competed in Jeopardy [11]. The
Austin-based company, Cycorp, known for its large hand-coded AI system, also
emphasises learning from documents in more recent work [34]. More broadly,
“Knowledge Extraction from Text” is a well-known domain of computing re-
search (with workshops running since 2013). The requirements for knowledge
extraction from mathematical text, in particular, are being worked out in spe-
cialist efforts in linguistics and NLP [13, 10, 8] (and see in particular the survey
in [14]).
Issues associated with mining Wikipedia and scientific literature have been
explored (e.g., [7], [16], [17]) with successful scientific and technical proofs-of-
concept at various scales. The technical issues associated with mining mathe-
matical literature are increasingly well-understood [29] – and implementation
work is ongoing.9 Argument mining is, however, a relatively new area [33, 22].
In the current state of the art, discourse structure may have to be laboriously
hand-coded.10 We may be aided in our specific pursuit by the fact that much of
mathematics is relatively “formulaic.” For example, the first 100 most frequent
schematic constructions (like “let X be a Y ”) were shown to cover half of the
sentences on the detailed but mathematically informal ProofWiki website [18].
Even so, as we’ve seen in our case study, modelling mathematical arguments
is far from a trivial task. The initially quite simple language of ‘implies’ and
‘analogy’ from Figure 1 is complemented by a range of much more complex
relations in Figure 5, like ‘necessary for the implication to hold’. The
‘Reform’ relation has been applied to individual pieces of mathematical content,
but in some cases the relevant transformations would have to happen on the
graph of statements, for example, if we were to specify the ‘analogy’ between
two problem statements; reasoning from analogy can be complicated [25, 36].
The precise representations need to be worked out; and, as indicated above, we
also want our representations to be capable of simulating the reasoning evolved
in an effective manner.
Looking to the future, given a suitably-represented knowledge base of math-
ematical facts from whatever source, one interesting line for research (with a
Q&A feel) would build on the work of Nuamah et al [30], who describe a strat-
egy for automatically assembling the answers to queries when the answers are
not directly stored in the database. As a simple example, it may be the case that
there is no prerecorded answer to the following question:
Does the country x that has the highest GDP per capita (GDP/c) out of
all countries in South America have a higher GDP/c than the country y





Nevertheless the answer may be computed from information that is available
in the database (namely, GDP/c for all countries, together with the association
of countries to continents). We assert that at a high level the logic of ‘func-
tional inference from heterogenous data’ would be similar if the data was not
CIA Fact Book-style, but, instead, mathematical facts – or, indeed, facts about
mathematical arguments.
Broadly, the proposal that we suggest pursues the slow refinement of math-
ematical knowledge from knowledge about mathematical arguments. We can
compare and contrast this with a famous proposal in the computer mathematics
community, the QED manifesto [2]. This proposed “a project to build a com-
puter system that effectively represents all important mathematical knowledge
and techniques.” We agree with this general aim. However, the QED manifesto
relied on the idea of “the use of strict formality in the internal representation of
knowledge and the use of mechanical methods to check proofs of the correctness
of all entries in the system.” If relied on as the only method, formal mathe-
matics may be a premature optimisation. More specifically, before achieving full
formality, it may be necessary to be ‘capable of being in uncertainties’ [20]. Later
reassessments of the QED proposal [43, 15] have had to deal with the fact that,
by in large, it has not worked out as hoped.
In this paper, we have been inspired by the observation that Q&A is both a
useful source of explicitly represented reasoning, and a useful (i.e., ‘effective’)
modality for developing additional explicit reasonings. Q&A is a popular way
for humans to learn from each other – including, in particular, about technical
subjects like mathematics and computer programming. There are large existing
‘traces’ of Q&A dialogues available online, and many users actively engaging
with these dialogues on a daily basis (both as querents and respondents). Q&A
dialogues are, accordingly, a likely source of explicit knowledge – and they are,
also, if our ansatz is correct, a potential modality for automated knowledge-
building that could realise Turing’s vision of machines that ‘converse with each
other to sharpen their wits’ [41]. Naturally, dialogues between humans and auto-
mated agents/agencies would be a potential application. Systems like this could
support activities ranging from automatic tutoring to mixed initiative proof and
program-construction.
Argumentation techniques for agent research are surveyed in [9]. This work
should be compared with Ganesalingam and Gowers’s natural-language gener-
ating automated problem solver [12]. The kinds of natural language that are
employed in Q&A dialogues is quite different from that employed in the text-
book problems that are the focus of [12]. Nevertheless, at the level our proof-of-
concept illustration above, we seem to have a good handle on the semantics of
mathematical dialogues, and we should be able to support textbook reasoning as
a special case. It should also be possible to map dialogue semantics to a theorem
proving system (an LCF-inspired system like the one used by Ganesalingam and
Gowers, would be one starting point but others should be considered as well).
Lastly, to evaluate systems working in this area – whether driven by argumen-
tation, agents, theorem proving, simple machine learning heuristics, some com-
bination, or by some other approach entirely – we propose the simple knowledge-
based computational benchmarking task SEMATCH, which is defined as follows.
This challenge problem requires a system to match existing questions and an-
swers selected from the Stack Exchange network. This can be solved in suitably-
blinded forward and backward directions (Q7→A or A7→Q); that is, the program
that is being tested will be presented with a sample of questions and answers,
and will not be told which question matches which answer: it will then try to
recover that information by reasoning about the sample’s content. Accordingly,
SEMATCH can be applied to routinely evaluate heuristics, without necessarily re-
quiring a system that is capable of generating new answers or new questions. As
a benchmarking problem for programs that reason about natural language, one
could compare SEMATCH with the Winograd Schema Challenge [23], which is
similarly open-ended as to methods of solution. However, the Winograd Schema
Challenge currently requires expert intervention to generate new test questions,
which follow a certain prescribed form. In the case of SEMATCH, a large cor-
pus of ground-truthed data exists. Additional benchmarks related to the same
ground-truthed data can be straightforwardly devised, e.g., to correctly sort
the answers to a given question in order of empirical user ratings, based on their
contents. Ultimately, after workouts with evaluation metrics like this, along with
generative experiments, a system may be devised that can answer specific sets
of domain problems correctly, and have its answers validated by human experts.
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